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Situated Interpretations of Nationalism,
Imperialism, and Cosmopolitanism:
Revisiting the Writings of Liang in
the Encounter Between Worlds
CHENCHEN ZHANG*
Abstract The idea of the nation has been considered to have delivered political
modernity from its native Europe to the rest of the world. The same applies,
though more implicitly, to those paradoxes inherent to the nationalist ideology –
that between universalism and national particularity and that between liberal
nationalism and imperialism. This article seeks to complicate these theses by
looking at the interpretations of nationalism, imperialism, and cosmopolitanism
provided by Liang Qichao, one of the most influential Chinese intellectuals in early
twentieth century, during his exile in Japan when increasingly exposed to the
encounter between worlds. This reading also engages with the wider debates on
modernity/modernities in non-Western societies through showing that neither the
“consumers of modernity” approach nor the “creative adaptations” approach can
be easily applied here. I argue that the various tensions, contingencies and
historical situatedness in Liang’s accounts of the nation-state structure re-
present and constitute the paradox of the structure itself. They also shed light
on contemporary debates about the limits of our political imagination in the
misnamed “global politics” beyond the false opposition between nationalism and
cosmopolitanism.
*****
Introduction
This article seeks to revisit the political writings of Liang Qichao
(1873–1929), one of the most influential “enlightenment” writers1
in modern China, on the premise that they bear significant rel-
evance to contemporary debates over modernity, postcoloniality
and our political imagination beyond the specific spatial-temporal
notion of political community expressed by the nation-state. This
revisiting is driven by an observation of the tendency in nation-
alism studies where universalistic models of nationalism are
posited side by side with the persistence of the “incommensura-
bility of cultures” and of “identities” (Sontag 2002:346). This is to
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say, researchers either label nationalisms in terms of universal-
istic models (e.g. “liberal nationalism” versus “non-liberal nation-
alism”, “political nationalism” versus “cultural nationalism”, “civic
nationalism” versus “ethnic nationalism”, and even “Western
nationalism” versus “Eastern nationalism”), or get caught into the
narrative of cultural identities. Treating Liang’s writing on nation
and nationalism beyond the framework of “Chinese nationalism”
in which it has been usually contextualised2, I assume that
nationalism, as a “universal model against universalism”
(Delannoi 1999:77), is one of the defining components of political
modernity, understood here as the conceptual and institutional
construction of the territorially defined nation-state as the exclu-
sive mediator between claims of universality and those of differ-
ence (Walker 1993). But the way in which nationalism as well as
modernity “spreads” from the West to the Rest of the world is
much more complicated. Through the case of Liang, I intend to
show that neither the “consumer of Western modular national-
ism” reading nor the “creative adaptation” reading is adequate.
Rather, what we see here is an incoherent mixture of unconscious
mistranslation and selective employment of tradition, to which
the East-West and/or tradition-modernity dualism cannot be
easily applied.
The article first gives a brief overview of the different approaches
to modernity in the non-west through the lens of nationalism, with
special reference to discussions on “Chinese modernity”. It then
examines in detail the situated interpretations of nationalism,
imperialism and cosmopolitanism offered by Liang during his exile
in Japan at the turn of the twentieth century. I argue that while his
metaphorical articulation of nationalism as “the beauty of history”
unconsciously ignored the ontological analogy between the nation
and the individual in modern (i.e. Western) political philosophy of
the nation-state, Liang’s highly racialised elaboration on “national
imperialism” on the other hand exposed and reinforced the paradox
between Enlightenment universalism and Romanticist particular-
ism. Finally, I shall examine how Laing’s return to (Chinese)
cosmopolitanism mirrors contemporary trends of cosmopolitan
thought which are, more often than not, still locked in homog-
enous, solid, nationalist space. This reading shows that a complex
web of meanings of different origins arose in Liang’s engaging
translation of knowledge, instead of a one-dimensional process of
“consuming” or consciously creating “difference”. It however also
discloses certain historical scenarios in which the allegedly univer-
sal triumph of the hyphenated nation-state was disturbed and the
“secret conflicts between state and nation” (Arendt 1976:230) was
never fully reconciled.
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“Consumers of Modernity”, “Creative Adaptation” and
Multiple Modernities
This section briefly reviews different approaches to the problem of
modernity in the non-West in general, and in East Asia in particu-
lar. Although its flaws have now been generally acknowledged and
widely discussed, the “consumers of modernity” approach to state
development used to be dominant in historical studies of the non-
Western world. It implies a certain perception of modernity as
wave-like, flowing from Western Europe to the rest of the world.
Countries/nations could be hence ranked according to their posi-
tion on this single, directed wave. From this perspective, the
modern history of East Asia, as the title of a representative work
from the 1960s indicates, is nothing more than “A History of the
Western impact and the Eastern Response” (Clyde and Beers 1966).
The seemingly natural logic is that through the response of the local
elites of non-Western countries to the wave of modernisation, the
model of (Western) nation-state could be transplanted, successfully
or not, to these other parts of the world. The rise and expansion of
the Japanese empire used to be narrated as a successful trans-
plantation of Western modernity, with its destruction also making
explicit the unresolvable contradictions of Western imperialism. A
standard modernising history of Japan within this approach would
be one that starts with a resolute rupture from the past, both in
temporal and spatial terms, as read from the popular Datsu-A Ron
(discourse on de-Asianisation) in the late nineteenth century.
Concerning the “spread” of modern nationalism, although more
sophisticated stories were told by Anderson about nationalism in
Europe, America and elsewhere (Anderson 2006), postcolonialist
scholars such as Chatterjee would argue that the underlying logic
seems to remain that nationalisms in the Rest “have to choose their
imagined community from certain ‘modular’ forms” made ready for
them by Europeans and Americans. In short, non-Western popu-
lations – in light of the “first in Europe, then elsewhere” rule
Chakrabarty has spoken of (2000:7) – can only be “perpetual con-
sumers of modernity” (Chatterjee 1993:5).
The “creative adaption” approach therefore enunciates the “call to
difference” (Taylor 1997:44) felt by modernizing nationalist elites in
the non-West. Taylor contends that in responding to the encounters
with the West, the local elites felt the need to do more than merely
what has been done – the modular already made available – in the
West. This leads to, in the words of Taylor, a creative adaptation
drawn on the cultural resources of their tradition. The creative
adaptations accordingly have to be “different from culture to culture”
(ibid.). This argument resembles Chaterjee’s critique on Anderson
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that “the most creative results” of nationalisms in Asia and Africa are
posited on “a difference with the ‘modular’ forms of the national
society propagated by the modern West” (Chatterjee 1993:5, his
italics).
The task thus is to explore how differences are made. One way
could be, according to Chatterjee’s observation on the Indian case,
dividing the world of social institutions into the material domain and
the spiritual one (1993:9). Similarly, this strategy was also prevalent
among those earliest reformers in China, as they named the two
domains “yong” (practical application) and “ti” (fundamental prin-
ciples)3. But the recognition of this formula among Chinese intellec-
tuals was drawing to an end by the time of the First Sino-Japanese
War. The humiliating defeat forced them to doubt the validity and the
value of their “fundamental principles”, and embrace the Western
ideas with body and soul. This is indeed what Liang Qichao, and
many of his contemporaries, mainly argued for after the failed
Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898.What if even the spiritual domain is
no longer maintainable vis-à-vis Western civilisation? It is on this
account that Levenson poses the dilemma and dichotomy of “history
and value” in modern Chinese history: the conflict between what is
“true” and what is “mine” entails the following: be Chinese and
pre-modern, or be modern and no longer Chinese. Even though in
his comprehensive studies of Liang, Levenson has noticed the way in
which Liang attempted to replace the opposition between the West
and China with the opposition between the “modernized” and the “un-
modernized” – that is to say, when speaking of parliamentarianism,
a claim is made that “there is no Western parliamentarianism; there
are only parliaments in the West”, and China needs only “institute
one herself” (Levenson 1959:127); what is presented here is still, as
Dirlik comments on “the modernizationist perspective of historians”,
“manifestations of a Chinese inability to liberate themselves from the
burden of a weighty past”. Yet from an alternative perspective, these
struggles may appear as “the very contradictions of a Chinese
modernism” (Dirlik 2005), or of modernity in China.
Going back to Leveson’s discussion (through Liang) on
parliamentarianism, what if China has indeed managed to institute
a parliament that is even better the Western ones? What if one has
managed to discovered a parliamentary spirit in the thousands of
canonical books that are genuinely Chinese? The problem is exactly
the same one as informed by recent critiques on multiple moder-
nities: that the West “remains the point of reference”, and that it
remains unquestioned “the assumption of internal civilizational
dynamics that developed in isolation until the point of contact with
Western modernity” (Bhambra 2007:65) – so that one can articulate
difference/particularity through identifying a parliamentary spirit
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in the internal universe of Chinese culture. Social sciences and
humanities have witnessed the rise of various forms of pluralising
modernity – such as possible, alternative or multiple modernities
(see Eisenstadt 1999; Mitchell 2000; Taylor 2001) – from the 1990s
onwards, yet many of the developments in this direction are not
radically transformative as they seem like to be. As Thomassen
notes, one of the leading strands in the studies of multiple moder-
nities – the historical-comparative studies of civilisations by
Eisenstadt “stayed within a Weberian comparative method and
analytical framework” (Thomassen 2010:328). In a way, the method
of multiple modernities has been further developed but not sub-
stantially moved beyond the motif of “creative adaptation”. If
staying with the assumption that an original Western modernity is
adapted differently “from culture to culture”, the irony is turned
into destiny: that the demand for difference must be based on the
fact that they have accepted the West as the universal.
It is within these wider debates that this specific reading of Liang
is situated. It intends not to find out how Liang’s writing on nation-
alism accords to or deviates from a Western model of nationalism;
nor does it focus on the moments of traditional culture that may
contribute to creative adaptations. Rather, it assumes that nation-
alism, or the alliance and tension between the nation and the state
must be contextualised within the global conditions of the desire for
particularity’ (Duara 2002:97), and explores under these conditions
how knowledge of nation, empire and cosmopolis is produced,
mediated and manifested in this historical conjuncture.
History and Mind: Nationalism as “The Beauty of History”
It might be useful to give a short note on Liang’s intellectual life for
general readers. During the 1890s, Liang was best known as a
disciple of Kang Youwei, a prominent scholar in Confucius classics
and a supporter of constitutional monarchy based on Confucian
justification. Under Kang’s overwhelming influence, Liang had
sought to synchronize classical Confucian sanctions with “Western
values” by taking Kang’s approach of examining the authenticity of
the Confucian classics, an approach severely criticized by himself
some years later. Liang was forced into exile to Japan in 1899
following the failure of the Hundred Days’ Reform, and this started
a period in which both Liang’s fame and his intellectual creativity
reached their zenith. The main reason could be that Japan provided
him with an ideal environment where he could commit himself to
absorbing and introducing modern western scholarship. He would
soon find a treasure of modern concepts in the rapidly changing
Japanese vocabulary, which include guojia (J: kokka; the state),
Situated Interpretations 347
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 27 No. 3 September 2014
guomin/minzu (J: kokumin/minzoku; the nation, or the citizenry),
lishi (J: rekishi; history), and zhuquan (J: shuken; sovereignty).
Japanese sinologist Kagami Mitsuyuki considers Liang to be the
first one to use the term “minzu” in Chinese literature, and the first
to connected the concept of China with that of the nation – through
the term “zhongguo minzu” in 1901 and “zhonghua minzu” (both
meaning Chinese nation) in 1902 (Kagami 2008:16). Liang’s think-
ing is thought to be characterised by continuous changes to fit the
dramatically changing political and intellectual climate in his time.
However, some researchers also take these strategic changes them-
selves as “persistent unity” beneath them (Levenson 1959).
Before introducing Liang’s interpretation of nationalism, let us
first take a glance at his presentation to his readers (many of whom
were Chinese revolutionaries in exile in Japan) of a new view of world
history. This linear, evolutionary and progressive view of world
history has now turned into a universally accepted myth4, but in his
time it was a true revolution – as Liang himself literally claimed, to
make a revolution in China, one must make a revolution in history
studies5. Thus he drew an ambitious outline of what he called “New
Historiography” in 1902. This work began with a criticism of tradi-
tional Chinese historiography, while admitting that history was the
only discipline which had developed for thousands of years in China
in comparison to all the prevalent disciplines in Europe at the time.
Liang claimed at the very beginning, “History is the broadest and
most vital discipline of all knowledge. It is the mirror reflecting the
nation; it is also the source of patriotism. For the facts that nation-
alism is flourishing in today’s Europe and that all the countries there
are making daily progress toward civilisation, history writing proudly
claims a great responsibility.” (Liang 2001: 1628) The glowing praise
for the function of history writing may indicate that the following
discussion would focus on the project of a national history, since the
primary role of history study was to bring prosperity to the nation.
Yet the logic of the “New Historiography” was that the national
narrative became possible only when the imagination and construc-
tion of global history emerged out of teleological universalism.
This essay mainly developed a step-by-step approach to redefin-
ing history. In the last and most important part of it, Liang finally
reached a complete definition of history, which is “the narrative of
the development of human races and the competition among them”
(2001: 1634). It is true that this version of world history was “not
only written as an account of the European, and especially, Aryan,
conquest of the world, it is also written from the European per-
spective of conquest and the bringing of enlightenment to the
world” (Duara 1995: 33). However, we have to notice that here the
consciousness of world history and especially of the relationship
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between history and the nation was also reconfigured in the very
process of translation, both metaphorically and practically, when
different shades of meaning from both foreign and “traditional”
ideas were blended with one another and became deviating from
the original “source”.
At first glance, this text clearly revealed how eagerly and unques-
tionably Liang, like many of his contemporaries, accepted the evo-
lutionary and race-oriented idea of world history. They all rejected
the old, so-called “twenty-four dynastic” histories as non-history, or
history of slavery6, and instead sought to retell the story of the
twenty-four dynasties as national history in the fashion of Enlight-
enment narrative7. Yet in this reading, in Hegelian terms, history
had nothing to do with the “consciousness of freedom”. The devia-
tion lay in the fact that in Liang’s new history, the development of
world history was not paralleled by the very notion of “idea”; On the
contrary, the idea belonged to a category in opposition to the
category of history8. Evolutionary history was a useful tool situated
in certain historical conjunctures, rather than an abstract concept
– it must be fully understood at this particular moment, because it
was a matter of survival. Beyond this practical concern, Liang
retained the realm of idea, or ethics, to be realised in the future.
In another highly relevant essay entitled “on the similarities and
differences between changes of the idea of the state” (1901), Liang
illustrated the changes of the idea of the state via the following
diagram (2001: 765):
The idea of the 
state
The past
1. The age of 
familism
2. The age of 
tribalism
3. The age of 
imperialism
a. The theocra?c 
empire
b. The non-
theocra?c 
empire
The present
4. The age of 
na?onalism
5. The age of 
na?onal 
imperialism 
The future
6. The age of 
universal 
harmony
Situated Interpretations 349
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 27 No. 3 September 2014
He then concluded that within the present order, Europe and
North America were in the age of nationalism and national imperi-
alism in parallel, whereas Asia was in the age of ancient imperialism
and nationalism. To be more realistic, the present world was no
more than a stage in which only nationalism and national imperi-
alism played their roles. Nationalism, as understood by Liang, was
derived from the idea that a legitimate state must be founded by the
consent of the people, and accordingly the people have unlimited
sovereignty and the government cannot go against the people’s will9.
He laid great emphasis on the leading role of nationalism in recent
European history, which he believed “has benefited from nothing so
much as from nationalism.” (2001: 766) In other words, the utmost
significance of nationalism was, for Liang, that it had served both as
the cause of and as the impetus to the progress of Europe. And that
nationalism must be transplanted into China since it was the key to
gaining a position on the ladder of progress.
In an intriguing passage on the difference between the “world” and
the “state”, Liang wrote: “Scholars of today are not unaware of the
beauty of this doctrine (cosmopolitanism), but viewing it as the
beauty of mind, not the beauty of history. Therefore, it is the state,
not the world that is taken as the highest group” (2001:557).
Through placing mind in opposition to history, he in fact named
nationalism “the beauty of history”, in contrast to cosmopolitanism
as “the beauty of mind”. That is to say, nationalism was conceived
as a necessary phase in modern history and also as a powerful
means to entering into World History. Although Liang definitely tried
to reformulate the former empire to be a modern polity that binds
the imagined community of the nation and the political entity of the
state, this reformulation, just as his acceptance of the seemingly
Hegelian narrative of world history, was a practical matter about
survival rather than a conceptual one. What was absent in this
understanding was the notion of the nation, or the hyphenated
nation-state, as the mediator of absolute individualism and the
universalistic principle of humanity. There was indeed, as Levenson
talentedly remarks, a conflict between history and value. But the
signified is not as he says – namely the Chinese was history, was
mine; and the Western was the value, was true. On the contrary,
the value was in China, but History was in the West. To preserve the
value, the nation must be conquered by the state and get onto the
historical stages of nationalism, and then national imperialism.
Nationalism and National Imperialism
The essay published by Liang in 1903 introducing the
Staatswissenschaft of Bluntschliis generally viewed as marking the
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transformation of his political position from liberalism to statism.10
He famously declared in this essay that “China’s most urgent need
is organic unity and powerful order, and liberty and equality are
secondary” (2001: 450). On the surface, the reason for this trans-
formation can to be taken to be the expansion of imperial powers
across the world and especially the failure of the Boer and Filipino
struggles he had witnessed. But curiously enough, his attitude
toward imperialism was rather ambiguous. Obviously he main-
tained that the increasing political and economic penetration of the
colonies or semi-colonies by Euro-Americans sounded great alarm
to China11. In this sense, nationalism, which he urged China to
“practice” undoubtedly, served the purpose of fighting the foreign
power off; it was the synonym of anti-imperialism.12 But in his
vision of global history, “the age of nationalism” and “the age of
national imperialism” appeared as two successive stages where one
inevitably led to another.
This conviction, that nationalism and imperialism are ranked on
the ladder of progress in an invariable sequence, and the movement
from one stage to another is an irreversible historical course, had
two implications. One was that China had to first step onto the
stage of nationalism before entering the next stage, the other being
that the ultimate goal of China would be, and should be, to reach
the stage of imperialism. He also noticed the fundamental distinc-
tions between imperialism of the nineteenth century and that
before the eighteenth century. The latter, according to Liang, was
derived from the empire of the monarch; whereas the former from
the empire of the whole nation. Drawing a problematic analogy
between a state and a human being, he suggested that nationalism
is an indispensable element for a state to develop from “an embryo”
to a full-fledged and autonomous organism. In other words, a state
cannot be called a state, just like a person cannot be called a
person if it remains in the state of embryonism, unless it had
already moved through the stage of nationalism. And the progress
from nationalism to imperialism was an achievement to accomplish
after the child becomes an adult (2001: 767). Therefore, he had not
changed his opinion until 1903 that placing state interests and
strong government over interests of the people should not be
applied to today’s China, even though it was then prevailing in the
West – since China had never gone through the nationalist stage,
she was not qualified as a state, or a person, yet. This metaphor of
the historical development of a state as the natural growth of a
human being may easily remind us of the way in which Liang
interpreted the conception of civilisation: “to be a nation was to be
civilised, and vice versa” (Duara 2004: 91). Now he went one step
further and pointed out that to be a national empire was to be more
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civilised. At the heart of these accounts was the belief that while
imperial expansion is the greatest cause of the crisis in China; their
conquest is, from many aspects, a civilising mission.
Liang’s perception of imperialism as an advanced stage in linear
history was also affected by the confrontation of Westerners and
Japanese in China after the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. After all,
“Japan was not just another imperialist; it was an Asian imperialist”
(Iriye 1970:143). For some writers like Liang, Japan was simply
following trends in Europe; whereas for others like Sun Yat-sen, the
rise of Japanese imperialism harboured the possibility that China
might seek alliance with Japan against the West. Moreover, even for
Liang, the way in which he employed imperialist discourse to
interpret and predict Chinese history was predicated upon an
unquestioning acceptance of Japanese Orientalism and Asianism.
As is well known, the Japanese began to replace the word chu¯goku
(literally “middle kingdom”, as in Chinese) with shina, which was a
transliteration of the English word China, to refer to China. Through
this replacement, as Stephan Tanaka puts it, “Japanese were using
the West and Asia as other(s) to construct their own sense of a
Japanese nation as modern and oriental” (1993: 18). Liang, always
claiming that Japanese books were an efficient and primary short-
cut to Western Knowledge, unsurprisingly followed this usage in his
early works of the exile period. He began to call China “zhina” (the
Chinese pronunciation of the same two characters in the word
shina) and call the Chinese “zhina-ren” (people of zhina).
This process of self-Orientalisation was reinforced by the dis-
course on Asia as a geographical space in which China should be
located. While being a geographical space and a concept invented
by the Westerners, Yazhou (or Ajia in Japanese) had now enthusi-
astically embraced by both Chinese and Japanese politicians as
well as intellectuals, for “it provided them with a new concept with
which a new and yet contentious relationship was created” (Chow
2001:67). The referent was a spatial imaginary in which the leading
role of China could be reestablished, – as was put by Liang, “Asia
is China’s world, just like the World is Europe’s.” It was through the
reconfiguration of the spatial concept of Asia that Liang gained
access to the genealogy of imperialist discourse.
As Duara indicates in his work on the history of Manchukuo, our
current view of nationalism and imperialism as two very different
phenomena – that one is characterised by “citizenship, equality and
development” while the other by “domination, exploitation and the
reproduction of difference between ruler and ruled in the colonies”
(Duara 2004:9) – did not come into being until very recently. Even
though nationalism by now is no longer seen as related to citizen-
ship and equality in many observers’ view, it has been considered
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as an essential factor in the development of liberal states up until
the end of the Second World War. During the nineteenth century,
however, the two concepts could hardly be disentangled in the
imperial expansion, which were also regarded as national projects
– of a few major powers. Here Liang’s treating of imperialism as a
historical successor to nationalism must be put into the context of
the inextricable link between Enlightenment universalism and
Romantic particularism which is often raised in discussion nation-
alism(s) in the West. The opposition between the two is taken as a
fundamental one by Isaiah Berlin, who sees the transition from the
Enlightenment to Romanticism as “the greatest single shift in the
consciousness of the West that has occurred”, and having cracked
“the backbone of European thought” (Berlin 1999:1). Hence the
divide between civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism is still an
important component of the standard theory of nationalism.
But this divide or transition has been interrogated and made
complicated from different perspectives. Delannoi regards the
French Revolution as realising the combination of “applying the
Enlightenment rationale and expressing the Romantic soul
(Delannoi 1999:68), and Eagleton comments with remarkable
insight on the mutual construction of the politics of difference or
specificity and the Enlightenment claim of universal rights and
abstract equality (Eagleton 1990:30)13. The paradox between the
particular and the universal in nationalist ideology also puts two
other concepts into question: imperialism and cosmopolitanism. At
one end, cosmopolitanism embraces a universalistic view of world
history while being locked into a state-oriented mode of global
space” (Campbell & Shapiro 1999: xii); At the other end, based on
missionary and racist ideologies, modern imperialism simultane-
ously reinforces and challenges the ideal model of the nation-state.
Therefore it is always a disturbing question for liberal historians of
nationalism, as Balibar suggests, that one cannot convincingly
explain “where and when does the transition from ‘liberal nation-
alism’ to ‘imperialist nationalism’ occur” (Balibar 1991: 65).
What are the implications of Liang’s intuitive and superficial
understanding of the links between nationalism and imperialism
for our task of rethinking the modern? Taking the West as the point
of reference, it highlights the paradox in the ideal of liberal nation
state on one hand, and shows the so-called inherent contradicto-
riness in the nationalist thinking of indigenous elites on the other.
That is, in order to challenge the imperial structure, they must
share the same system of doctrines with those whose rule they
challenged in the first place.14 But this is only half of the story – if
we no longer take Western modular nationalism as the only
framework of analysis, it is intriguing to see that the abovemen-
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tioned ethical question for “liberal historians of nationalism” is
cancelled out. Liang did recognise the inextricable connection
between nationalism and imperialism in his time as contemporary
critical historians do, but he never criticised such a connection.
This surely has to do with the spatial and temporal limitations to
which every writer or thinker is bound. But more importantly, there
is no need for criticising it or trying to answer the question for
liberal nationalists, as Liang held an essentially instrumental per-
ception of the nation and the nation-state. As said earlier, the
ontological analogy between the sovereign state and the autono-
mous individual is absent in this understanding. These discourses
on the historical course of the state on the one hand surely would
not emerge without the encounters between worlds; but on the
other hand, as the problematic of the modern is always of “global
dimensions”, they should be considered more than “the cultural
variants of an original European modernity”, but a constituent of
the “multiple co-presences of modernity” (Bhambra 2007:71).
The “Return” to Cosmopolitanism
In his late years, especially after the First World War, Liang once
again allegedly changed his mind and this time he was considered
to revert to Chinese tradition, of which a crucial element was, as he
believed, cosmopolitanism. Late in his life he wrote briefly on cos-
mopolitanism and traditional Chinese thought: “[W]e Chinese
people have never recognised the nation as the highest group,
instead, we maintain that there must be a higher group sovereign
over all the nations, which is called tianxia (under Heaven). . . .
Take the peace and happiness of mankind as a whole, rather than
of a single nation, as the aim and end. Such kind of philanthropic
cosmopolitanism has been, to be sure, the core of our political
theories for thousands of years.” (2005: 733–34) When he was
advocating nationalism, he powerfully argued that “the commonly
accepted idea” was “the nation, instead of the world, is the highest
group” among all groups of human society. But by 1923 his argu-
ment was completely reversed: “Chinese people have never identi-
fied the nation as the highest group of the human being since the
beginning of their civilisation. Their political theory is meant for all
mankind; accordingly it aims at keeping the peace of all-under-
heaven (ping tianxia). The nation is merely a stage, along with the
family, towards the tianxia.” (1998: 5)
Thus ironically, in claiming that cosmopolitanism, or, rather, a
view of China-centred universalism was at the heart of traditional
Chinese philosophy, Liang’s argument ended up regarding univer-
salism as an essential dimension of the national character of China,
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or, Chineseness. But the effort to prove that Chinese universalism
(as paradoxical as the term itself reveals) as an attribute of nation-
ality had existed throughout history was only meant to manifest its
particularity. For some, this irony implies a transition from a China
as the world, when cosmopolitanism, in the face of Confucianism,
not only informed the intellectuals but also “correspond to the
day-to-day life in rural China”, to a China provincialising herself to
become a nation, hence cosmopolitanism becoming one defining
feature of her cultural identity (Levenson 1971:5). Is it not the
presumption of this interpretation that the cosmopolitanism as
informed by Zeno and Kant15 is a cosmopolitanism without adjec-
tive, one that needs not to be mediated by any particularity, and
hence cosmopolitanism as such?
Similar concerns have been raised around the current revival of
the academic interests in cosmopolitanism as one characteristic of
“European identity” (e.g. Delanty & Rumford 2005; Rumford 2007).
Scholars question the “Europeanness” of cosmopolitanism through
reflecting upon its historical configurations: how they are drawn
upon the ambiguous portraits of the rootless, the outsider and the
colonial other (Kofman 2005; Levy & Sznaider 2007). In particular,
Honig sets out to test the ontological paradox of cosmopolitan
thinking in her critique of “rooted and affective” cosmopolitanism
proposed by Kristeva. By making its way through France, through
“the national spirit as esprit general reached by the French Enlight-
enment” (Kristeva 1993:60), this cosmopolitanism works to “shore
up a uniquely French identity, even while claiming to overcome or
transcend it” (Honig 1998:204). Thus highlighting the differences
between Chinese, European and French versions of cosmopolitan-
ism, or distinguishing between tianxia and cosmopolis, does little to
acknowledge and explore the paradoxical entanglement of nation-
alism and cosmopolitanism. In these narratives, essentialist under-
standings of culture remain largely unchallenged – wherein the
Other is certainly welcome, yet at the same time is considered as
ethically obliged to reaffirm and enrich existing categories such as
culture and the nation.
Conclusion
In formulating the “very contradictions” of Chinese modernism,
Dirlik writes:
Enlightenment at once as a means of liberation from the past and a negation of
native subjectivity and learning; the past at once as a source of identity and a
burden on the present; the individual at once as citizen of a modern nation and a
threat to collective national liberation; . . . the nation at once as an agent of
cosmopolitan universalism and a defence against hegemony that closes out the
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world in perpetuation of native parochialism. The contradictions could be multiplied
endlessly. (2005: 117)
It seems both unnecessary and undesirable to clarify which con-
tradictions are generalisable and which are not. The contradictions
of modernity may contain at once commonality and distinctiveness,
shared problematic and contingent traces. Truly it was “modernity
that invented one world out of the many worlds” (Dirlik 2008:20),
but from this also follows that it must be a conscious labour to
re-account for the many worlds, not only before and after but also
accompanying, the invention of modernity.
The themes I have explored in this article are essentially modern.
They concern the spatial and temporal solution and imaginary of
political community expressed by the nation-state structure,
“solidly held together by a mostly mythical, yet rarely politically
challenged or theoretically problematized hyphen” (Lapid 2001: 24).
I have shown various tensions, contingencies and historical
situatedness in Liang’s interpretations of this solution, which
indeed constitute the contingency and processuality of the solution
itself. While the state appeared as hegemonic actuality, the nation
was going to claim its ultimate ethical authority in some yet-to-
come world without nations.
If we are, as many are convinced, living in an age in which
“all three components of the nation-state (the nation, the state,
and the hyphen)” (Lapid 2001: 24) are undergoing profound
reconfigurations, it is not without benefit that we consider the
present through looking back at the past. The historical scenarios
revisited here show and contain the paradox of the hegemonic
structure of the nation-state in a certain context and hence shed
light on contemporary debates about the limits of our political
imagination in the misnamed arena of “global politics”- which in fact
refers to politics between and within states. Indeed, as this essay has
shown, one has to develop a better understanding of the historical
and conceptual roots nationalism and cosmopolitanism have in
common in order to move beyond the false opposition between them.
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Notes
1 Evidences could be found both in history and in the academic dis-
courses. People such as Mao Zedong and Hu Shi frankly spoke of the great
influence Liang had made on them, even though they themselves held
different political opinions. Duara in his well-known Rescuing History from
the Nation depicted Liang as “the first to write the history of China in the
narrative of the Enlightenment” (1995:33).
2 See for instance Bastid-Bruguière (2004); Murata (1996); Zhao
(2004).
3 The well-known slogan invented by the eminent official during the
late Qing Dynasty Zhang Zhidong said: Chinese learning for fundamental
principles and Western learning for practical application (Zhongxue weiti,
xixue weiyong).
4 This could be seen from many fierce criticisms about Fukuyama’s the
“end of history” thesis. In a sense, these wide-spread, effortless attacks on
Fukuyama’s argument are only to prove that his premise has been uni-
versally accepted.
5 Chatterjee has also shown us a parallel theme in his study of Bankim.
He notes that “the historical consciousness he (Bankim) is seeking to
invoke is in no way an ‘indigenous’ consciousness, because the preferred
discursive form of his historiography is modern European”(Chatterjee
1993:77).
6 Zou Rong (1885–1905), in his widely known and stimulating text
Geming Jun (Revolutionary Amy, first published in 1903 in Shanghai),
echoed Liang in an even more radical way, “the Chinese do not have
history. The so-called Twenty-four Dynastic Histories in China are but a
huge history of slavery. As slaves, the Chinese could not have a history of
their own making”. (Zou [1903]1956:353)
7 It is interesting to consider a classic example of “cosmopolitan
history” – the Essai sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations et sur les
principaux faits de l’histoire depuis Charlemagne jusqu’à Louis XIII by
Voltaire. The book outlines a “cosmopolitan history” that starts “with
France poised to undergo a great expansion of national spirit in the age of
Louis XIV” in its European portion, and closes with “the rejection of
Christianity by China and Japan” in its non-Western part (O’Brien
1997:50).
8 In the Hegelian scheme, to borrow Engels’s words, “However abstract
and idealist the form employed, the development of his ideas runs always
parallel to the development of world history, and the latter is indeed
supposed to be only the proof of the former” (Engels, quoted in Harvey
2001:296)
9 He also examined the theoretical sources of the two according to his
rather limited reading of European literature: the theory of popular sover-
eignty represented by Rousseau and the theory of “the right of the stron-
gest” by Spencer.
10 Zhengzhixue dajia bolunzhili zhi xueshuo (on the teachings of the
great politikwissenschaftler Bluntschli), in Liang (2001: 449–462).
11 In an essay entitled “Mieguo xinfa lun” (on the new rules for destroying
countries, 1901), Liang gave an in-depth analysis of what he saw as a new
“pattern” of destruction that had revealed itself in Poland, India, Philip-
pines, Egypt and many other countries controlled by imperial power.
Noting that economic infiltration into native structures was efficient
enough to destroy a country, he wrote: “To those who claim that opening
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mining, railroad, and concessionary rights to foreigners is not harmful to
the sovereignty of the whole, I advise you to read the history of the Boer
War.” (2001: 726)
12 Levenson formulates such kind of perception of nationalism as
follows: “It is interpreted in the beginning as organised resentment, a
device to make Chinese close ranks and resist enslavement; in the end, it
is the spirit which moves a people to take non-traditional measures to
implement resentment.” (1959:113)
13 See also Seth on the paradox between ethical universalism and
political particularism in the Revolution: “Was not Anacharsis Cloots more
in tune with the universalistic ethic of the French Revolution when he
championed a revolutionary war that would unite the ‘entire human family’
in a single republic, under the banner of liberty, with Paris as the capital
of the globe?” (1995:43) Regarding the Romanticism side, see Meinecke
(1970) and Balibar (1994) on the complicated relationship between “ethnic
nationalism” and cosmopolitanism in Fichte.
14 To quote Chatterjee again, nationalist thinking in the colony reasons
“within a framework of knowledge whose representational structure cor-
responds to the very structure of power nationalist thought seeks to
repudiate” (1986: 38–39).
15 Modern advocates of cosmopolitanism trace the source of such a
trend of political or philosophical thought to the ancient time. Fine and
Cohen, for example, elaborate four “moments” of cosmopolitanism in the
history of Western political thought: Zeno’s moment in ancient Greece,
Kant’s moment in the Enlightenment, Arendt’s in post-totalitarian thought
and Nussbaum’s in late North American thought (Fine & Cohen 2002).
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